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Open Source License Proliferation:  
Helpful Diversity or Hopeless Confusion? 
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz  
INTRODUCTION 
A decade ago, I observed that licenses were the ―unnoticed force‖ 
behind free and open source software (―FOSS‖).1 Since then, legal 
scholarship on FOSS licensing has gone from a trickle to a torrent.
2
 
Likewise, economists,
3
 political scientists,
4
 and anthropologists
5
 
(among others) have begun to focus on FOSS licensing, each from 
their own academic perspectives. FOSS programmers themselves 
 
  Professor of Law; Director for Academics in Law, Technology & the Arts, University 
of Washington School of Law; Washington Law Foundation Scholar. Many thanks to Jim 
Sfekas for his assistance in submitting the SimPL to OSI, and to David Ray for his research 
assistance.  
 1. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, How Copyleft Uses License Rights to Succeed in the Open 
Source Software Revolution and the Implications for Article 2B, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 179, 185 
(1999). 
 2. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 
112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002); Brian W. Carver, Share and Share Alike: Understanding and 
Enforcing Open Source and Free Software Licenses, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 443 (2005); 
Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software: Do Property Rights Still Matter?, 20 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2006); David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source Software, 
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 241; Daniel B. Ravicher, Facilitating Collaborative Software 
Development: The Enforceability of Mass-Market Public Software Licenses, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 
11 (2000); Greg R. Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source Software, 2004 UTAH L. 
REV. 563; Greg R. Vetter, ―Infectious” Open Source Software: Spreading Incentives or 
Promoting Resistance?, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 53 (2004); Jonathan Zittrain, Normative Principles 
for Evaluating Free and Proprietary Software, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 265 (2004).  
 3. See, e.g., Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Scope of Open Source Licensing, 21 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 20 (2005). 
 4. See, e.g., STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE (2004). 
 5. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER M. KELTY, TWO BITS: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE 
SOFTWARE (2008). 
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(known as ―hackers‖ in the FOSS community)6 have refocused on 
FOSS licensing,
7
 most notably by revising the most venerable FOSS 
license, the GNU General Public License (―GPL‖), for the first time 
in more than fifteen years.
8
  
One prominent issue among hackers
9
 and business users
10
 (but 
less noticed by legal scholars)
11
 has been ―license proliferation.‖ 
 
 6. As I explained in an earlier article: 
Software developers who have a passion for programming are called ―hackers.‖ THE 
NEW HACKER‘S DICTIONARY 233–34 (3d ed. 1996). Outside the software development 
community the term ―hacker‖ often refers to a programmer who writes malicious code 
such as viruses and worms. See id. at 130, 234. However, serious programmers use the 
term ―hacker‖ in a positive sense, as in: ―I‘m hacking some code to fix that bug.‖ See 
id. at 231. Hackers call malicious programmers ―crackers.‖ Id. at 234. See generally 
STEVEN LEVY, HACKERS: HEROES OF THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION (1984) (describing 
hackers in the positive sense of the term).  
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, General Public License 3.0: Hacking the Free Software Movement’s 
Constitution, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1015, 1016 n.3 (2005). 
 7. See, e.g., Posting of Russ Nelson to Open Source Initiative, User Licenses vs. 
Contributor Licenses, http://www.opensource.org/node/243 (Jan. 25, 2008, 21:17 PDT) (―I‘m 
starting to think that the dynamics of Open Source production are such that user licenses are 
crap. Yes, I‘m saying that everything that we‘ve put into licenses, all the thought, all the drama, 
all the durm-und-strang, is wasted. You might wonder why. Why, indeed. Consider that all 
Open Source licenses are a unilateral grant of privilege. That doesn‘t reflect the reality of the 
situation. Yes, somebody can take a code drop, but the advantage of Open Source doesn‘t exist 
without community. The value is not in the static code, the value is in the relationships between 
people. Free Software has never been about freedom (pace RMS). It‘s been about the 
community formed around software that is open for community contributions and use. So, it 
turns out that the part of licensing to which we have paid short shrift, contributor licensing, is 
the most important. It doesn‘t really matter what rights the users of the software gets. It matters, 
instead, what the contributor grants to the project. The relationship between the user and the 
project is a matter of necessity. If a user gives up that relationship, they lose, so there‘s no need 
to control that relationship. Anybody else with me on this? Or am I talkin smack?‖). See 
generally LAWRENCE ROSEN, OPEN SOURCE LICENSING: SOFTWARE FREEDOM AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2004) (discussing open source licensing in a book directed at 
programmers from the perspective of former OSI General Counsel who is also a programmer). 
 8. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, A First Look at General Public License 3.0, 24 
COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW., Nov. 2007, at 15 [hereinafter Gomulkiewicz, A First Look] 
(describing the terms of the revised GPL); Gomulkiewicz, supra note 6 (describing the prelude 
to the revision of GPLv2); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, De-Bugging Open Source Software 
Licensing, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 75 (2002) [hereinafter Gomulkiewicz, De-Bugging Open Source 
Software Licensing] (arguing that a revision of GPLv2 was long overdue). 
 9. See, e.g., Steven Vaughan-Nichols, OSI Should Close Open-Source Licenses, EWEEK, 
Feb. 16, 2005, http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Linux-and-Open-Source/OSI-Should-Close-Open-
Source-Licenses/.  
 10. Business users have noticed license proliferation. See Open Source License 
Proliferation Could Threaten Business IT, COMPUTERWORLD UK, Aug. 24, 2007, 
http://www.computerworlduk.com/management/it-business/services-sourcing/news/index.cfm? 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/9
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―Proliferation‖ refers to the scores of open source licenses that are 
now in use, with more being created all the time. The Open Source 
Initiative (―OSI‖) has certified more than sixty licenses12 as 
conforming to the Open Source Definition,
13
 a key measure of 
whether a license embodies FOSS principles.
14
 Hackers believe that 
license proliferation encumbers and retards the success of FOSS. The 
OSI has indentified the issue as one of its most strategic matters to 
address.
15
 
The license proliferation issue is particularly interesting because it 
turns conventional FOSS wisdom on its head. Hackers boast that 
their widely collaborative ―bazaar‖ model16 of software development 
produces higher quality code than code created using so-called 
proprietary
17
 ―cathedral‖ style software development.18 According to 
 
newsid=4829; Ken Spencer Brown, Open Source Serves Baskin-Robbins-Like Choices of 
Software; But It’s a Headache, Not a Treat; So Many Licenses Available, Companies Wrestling 
with 58 Flavors—and Counting, INVESTOR‘S BUS. DAILY, June 30, 2005, at A04; see also 
HEATHER J. MEEKER, THE OPEN SOURCE ALTERNATIVE: UNDERSTANDING RISKS AND 
LEVERAGING OPPORTUNITIES 66–70 (2008) (lawyer explaining license proliferation to business 
audience). 
 11. But see Zachary Katz, Pitfalls of Open Licensing: An Analysis of Creative Commons 
Licensing, 46 IDEA 391 (2006) (discussing license proliferation in the context of Creative 
Commons licensing); Greg R. Vetter, Claiming Copyleft in Open Source Software: What if the 
Free Software Foundation’s General Public License (GPL) Had Been Patented?, 2008 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 279, 308–10 (discussing license proliferation in the context of a thought exercise 
about ―what if‖ the GPL had been patented); Greg R. Vetter, Exit and Voice in Free and Open 
Source Software Licensing: Moderating the Rein over Software Users, 85 OR. L. REV. 183, 
216, 264 (2006) [hereinafter Vetter, Exit and Voice] (mentioning license proliferation issue).  
 12. Posting of Michael Tiemann to Open Source Initiative, Licenses by Name, 
http://www.opensource.org/licenses/alphabetical (Sept. 18, 2006, 12:56 PDT). 
 13. See Posting of Ken Coar to Open Source Initiative, The Open Source Definition, 
http://www.opensource.org/docs/osd (July 7, 2006, 15:49 PDT).  
 14. There is debate in the hacker community about whether the term ―free software‖ or 
―open source software‖ is more apt. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants 
in License Contracts: Tales from a Test of the Artistic License, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 335, 
337–38 (2009) (discussing the debate). 
 15. See discussion infra Part V; see also Posting of Acoliver to Open Source Initiative, 
OSI Board Meeting Minutes, January 9th, 2008, http://opensource.org/minutes20080109 (Mar. 
1, 2008, 18:19 PDT) (―Mr. Tiemann [OSI‘s President] suggests the board consider writing a 
draft of their priorities for 2008, especially concerning license proliferation. Hopefully license 
proliferation . . . will be one topic that can be advanced this year.‖).  
 16. ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND 
OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 19–64 (2d ed. 2001). 
 17. As I have discussed elsewhere, the label ―proprietary‖ is problematic because FOSS 
licensing depends on a proprietary right, namely copyright. The term ―commercial‖ also falls 
short because many businesses have grown up around FOSS. I prefer to contrast the term ―open 
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hackers, cathedral-developed code is used not because of its quality 
but because it is just-good-enough legacy code. When it comes to 
FOSS licenses, however, the tables are turned: the GPL and the BSD 
license are the entrenched just-good-enough
19
 legacy ―legal code.‖20  
This Article analyzes the license proliferation issue. In general, it 
examines whether the growing number of FOSS licenses represents 
hopeless confusion (as many hackers assume) or, instead, helpful 
diversity. In particular, it discusses why proliferation occurs and the 
pros and cons of multiple licenses. It points out that the primary 
culprits of license proliferation are often the loudest critics: those 
hackers who remain wed to legacy license forms, unwilling to replace 
outdated, poorly drafted, or legally insufficient licenses with newer 
versions. This means the FOSS community can only improve licenses 
by adding new ones. The Article concludes with an analysis of the 
role that OSI has played and can play to ameliorate the negative 
effects of so many FOSS licenses. To give the discussion context and 
color, the Article draws on my experience
21
 in submitting the Simple 
Public License to the OSI for certification. 
I. THE SIMPLE PUBLIC LICENSE (―SIMPL‖): A CASE STUDY 
Linus Torvalds once said: ―In many ways, my only gripe with the 
GPL has been how many words it seems to need to say something 
very simple.‖22 On another occasion he said: ―I don‘t think the GPL 
 
source‖ with ―binary use.‖ This seems to come closer to the heart of the matter by focusing on 
what the user gets (source or binary code) and what the user can do with the code that he or she 
gets (wide open rights versus use-only rights only). See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 6, at 1020–
21.  
 18. RAYMOND, supra note 16, at 19–64; see also MEEKER, supra note 10, at 26  
(―Proponents of the open source software development model posit that it produces better 
software than the proprietary model. In truth, the jury is probably still out on the question of 
which produces better products, and the answer may change with time or context.‖). 
 19. For a discussion of the buggy state of FOSS licenses, see Gomulkiewicz, De-bugging 
Open Source Software Licensing, supra note 8. 
 20. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) 
(popularizing the term ―legal code‖). 
 21. Stories can be a valuable way to help us understand law. See id. at 9 (―The law is best 
understood through stories . . . .‖). 
 22. Stephan Shankland, Torvalds: A Solaris Skeptic, CNET NEWS, Dec. 21, 2004, http:// 
news.cnet.com/Torvalds-a-Solaris-skeptic/2008-1082_3-5498799.html. 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/9
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is perfect, and one of my issues has been how verbose it is.‖23 The 
Free Software Foundation (―FSF‖) acknowledged this critique when 
it began to rewrite the GPL. The FSF said that it did not intend to 
simplify the GPL, however, and seemed skeptical that it could be 
done.
24
 It threw out a challenge: If anyone can simplify the GPL and 
remain true to its objectives, then show us how it can be done.
25
 
The SimPL represents a response to that challenge. I published the 
initial version of the SimPL as an appendix to an article describing 
the GPL revision process, which was, at that time, in its early 
stages.
26
 I annotated the SimPL much like a programmer annotates 
source code with comments, to demonstrate how the SimPL matched 
the intent of GPL version 2.0 (―GPLv2‖).27 When the FSF began the 
GPL revision process and opened up the process for public 
comments, I submitted the SimPL.
28
  
Publication of the SimPL and submission of it to the FSF 
generated some interest among hackers, but it had no apparent impact 
on the GPL revision.
29
 Hackers liked the license but thought it would 
not be used very often unless it had the imprimatur of a recognized 
FOSS organization such as the OSI.
30
 Indeed, as mentioned 
 
 23. Peter Gali, Torvalds: GPL Needs Minor Work, EWEEK, Nov. 29, 2004, http://www. 
eweek.com/c/a/Linux-and-Open-Source/Torvalds-GPL-Needs-Minor-Work/. 
 24. ―Anyone can make the simple complicated. Creativity is making the complicated 
simple.‖ Charles Mingus. 
 25. See Richard Stallman & Eben Moglen, GPL Version 3.0: Background to Adoption 
(June 9, 2005), http://www.fsf.org/licensing/essays/gpl3-background.html. 
 26. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 6, at 1037. 
 27. Id. at 1038–40. The SimPL matches up with GPL version 2.0, the then-current version 
and still the preferred version of many, including the key contributors to Linux. 
 28. The SimPL could be used in any way that FSF found helpful. The license for the 
SimPL license form was: ―You may do anything that you want with it.‖ Id. at 1036 n.119. 
 29. In response to my submission, one commentator exclaimed that the FSF should 
consider SimPL‘s approach, but for all intents and purposes the discussion ended there in the 
context of the GPL revision. Free Software Foundation, Welcome to GPLv3, 
http://gplv3.fsf.org (last visited Apr. 21, 2009). 
 30. As Professor McGowan has observed, FOSS licenses work like brands. A choice of 
licenses signals to other programmers that the licensor believes in software freedom as 
espoused by the Free Software Foundation (GPL brand) or, alternatively, freedom as articulated 
by the founders of OSI and the project leaders of various BSD UNIX variants (BSD License 
brand). See David McGowan, SCO What? Rhetoric, Law, and the Future of F/OSS Production 
2–3, 14–15 (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., Research Paper No. 04-9, 2004); see also Vetter, Exit 
and Voice, supra note 11, at 265; Gomulkiewicz, De-Bugging Open Source Software Licensing, 
supra note 8, at 82–83, 83 n.57 (discussing how hackers choose licenses). 
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previously, OSI has a process to certify licenses as conforming to the 
Open Source Definition. If a license is so certified, then programmers 
who use the license can use an ―OSI certified‖ logo31 on their 
product.
32
 
In the spring of 2007, the SimPL
33
 was submitted to OSI for 
certification.
34
 The OSI‘s approval process works as follows: The 
license author submits the license in HTML format, posts it on a 
public website, and provides an analysis of how the license conforms 
to the Open Source Definition. After that, OSI announces the 
submission of the license on its license-discuss listserv (―List‖), 
initiating public comment on the license.  
OSI‘s License Approval Committee monitors discussion on the 
 
 31. OSI applied with USPTO for a certification mark for ―OSI Certified.‖ U.S. Trademark 
Application No. 76020694 (filed Apr. 10, 2000). According to USPTO, however, OSI 
abandoned its certification mark application on Aug. 23, 2002. Id. Of course, OSI still can 
protect the mark under common law. Posting of Nelson to Open Source Initiative, Certification 
Mark, http://www.opensource.org/docs/certification_mark.html (Mar. 26, 2007, 15:37 PDT). 
OSI has considered whether to change from a certification to a service mark. This is reflected 
both in changes OSI made to its Bylaws, see Posting of Ken Coar to Open Source Initiative, 
Bylaws of the Open Source Initiative, http://www.opensource.org/bylaws (July 24, 2006, 23:22 
PDT) (reciting an amendment to Article III that deleted the word ―certification‖ from the 
description of OSI‘s trademark program); and in an Intent to Use application that OSI filed with 
the USPTO. See U.S. Trademark Registration No. 3514190 (filed Feb. 13, 2006) (registered 
Oct. 10, 2008). 
 32.  
Open source is a development method for software that harnesses the power of 
distributed peer review and transparency of process. The promise of open source is 
better quality, higher reliability, more flexibility, lower cost, and an end to predatory 
vendor lock-in.  
 The Open Source Initiative (OSI) is a non-profit corporation formed to educate 
about and advocate for the benefits of open source and to build bridges among 
different constituencies in the open-source community.  
 One of our most important activities is as a standards body, maintaining the Open 
Source Definition for the good of the community. The Open Source Initiative 
Approved License trademark and program creates a nexus of trust around which 
developers, users, corporations, and governments can organize open-source 
cooperation. 
Posting of Esr to Open Source Initiative, Home, http://www.opensource.org/ (Mar. 13, 2007, 
19:38 PDT). 
 33. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Simple Public License (SimPL) 2.0, http://www.law. 
washington.edu/CASRIP/License/SimplePublicLicense.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2008). 
 34. The SimPL has been approved by OSI. Posting of Michael Tiemann to Open Source 
Initiative, supra note 12. 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/9
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List. When the Committee thinks that consensus has been reached on 
the List, it recommends approval or rejection to the full OSI board, or 
it may provide feedback to the author about what needs to be done to 
secure approval.  
A. Vetting the SimPL on the List 
Discussion on the List is the main event.
35
 Anyone can join in. 
Comments come in colorful, caustic, often cynical, and sometimes 
snide e-mail messages.
36
 Most comments begin or end with the 
pronouncement ―IANAL‖ (I am not a lawyer), but generally it is 
clear that the commentators consider themselves to be experts on 
FOSS licensing and licensing law.
37
  
Some List commentators pointed out ways that the SimPL could 
hew closer to the intent of GPLv2. These comments often unearthed 
understandings of the GPL that are part of the hacker community‘s 
custom but are not necessarily reflected in the words of the GPL. 
Other comments pointed out important nuances of the GPL‘s terms or 
particularly sensitive scenarios that they were addressing.  
Other commentators argued that the SimPL contributed needlessly 
to license proliferation. According to these commentators, the GPL 
exists, so why would the FOSS community need another license that 
captures the same terms? One copyleft license is enough, they 
argued, particularly when the GPL has such a large user base. 
Other commentators argued that a short license (the SimPL fits on 
one law review-sized page) written in plain English could not be 
legally enforceable. Others seemed to question the intelligence of 
potential users of the SimPL, suggesting that perhaps they were not 
clever enough to understand the complex GPL. One commentator, for 
instance, called the SimPL a GPL with ―training wheels.‖38 
 
 35. All of the references in this part to comments on the SimPL can be found in the 
archives on the OSI website. Open Source Initiative Mailing Lists, http://www.opensource.org/ 
lists/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2008). 
 36. In a private e-mail, one participant warned me to ―put on your asbestos underwear.‖ 
E-mail from McCoy Smith to Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Professor of Law, Univ. of Wash. Sch. 
of Law (Mar. 16, 2007, 12:32) (on file with author). 
 37. Some lawyers also participate but most only lurk, ALAS (A Lawyer Afraid of Suit). 
 38. Email from Michael Tiemann to Matthew Flaschen (Sept. 26, 2007, 20:37) (on file 
with author). 
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Other commentators seemed to question the motives behind the 
creation and submission of the SimPL—what was the real reason the 
SimPL was being put forward?
39
 This line of comments probably 
reflected suspicion based on the author‘s former employment at 
Microsoft.
40
 Some hackers view Microsoft as their most hated enemy, 
so they are on constant guard against its actions.  
B. Responding to Comments from the List 
We
41
 replied to comments from the List in a series of e-mails that 
restated the comments and provided our responses. To comments 
about hewing closer to the GPL, we either proposed revisions to the 
SimPL that would better capture the intent of the GPL, or pointed out 
how the SimPL did in fact reflect the GPL‘s intent. To comments 
about the legal sufficiency of the SimPL, we explained that the 
SimPL had been vetted by several experienced licensing lawyers. To 
concerns about the SimPL being too simple, we pointed out that 
license length and complexity do not assure enforceability—in fact 
the opposite is often true. As to comments challenging the need for 
another copyleft license, we pointed to statements from Linus 
Torvalds and others complaining about the GPL‘s complexity and 
yearning for a simpler form,
42
 as well as the OSI‘s own policy that 
encourages simple, plain-language licenses.  
Replying to the ―motive‖ comments was difficult because these 
issues lay below the surface. The List commentators seemed 
concerned that the SimPL had been created to interfere with the GPL 
rewrite.
43
 We reiterated that the SimPL responded to real and publicly 
acknowledged shortcomings with FOSS licensing. We pointed out 
that many hackers, including Torvalds, wanted a better written GPL. 
 
 39. See Posting of Chris DiBona, to List email (Mar. 11, 2008) (on file with author) 
(prominent person in FOSS community, employed by Google, referring to the SimPL‘s 
―simplified license‖ objective as a ―pretext‖). 
 40. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 11, at 1018 n.15 (highlighting my former affiliation with 
Microsoft). 
 41. My student Jim Sfekas submitted the license on my behalf and provided invaluable 
assistance throughout the early stages of the process. 
 42. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 43. Microsoft has been accused of creating FUD in response to competitive challenges—
fear, uncertainty, and doubt. 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/9
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We also pointed out that the SimPL had not been created 
underground. It had been published in advance of the GPLv3 revision 
process, submitted to FSF for its use, and ignored in the GPLv3 
revision process. We also added a Preamble clearly stating that the 
SimPL‘s purpose is the same as the GPLv2 and that if anyone 
wonders about interpreting the meaning of the SimPL, it means the 
same thing as the GPL.
44
 
Addressing the license proliferation critique presented a unique 
challenge. The OSI will not approve a license unless it serves a 
different purpose than a previously approved license. On the one 
hand, the SimPL, by design, serves exactly the same purpose as the 
GPL: to provide a copyleft license. On the other hand, it serves a 
distinct purpose: to provide a license form that is comprehensible by 
the average programmer.
45
 In an important and fundamental respect, 
the purpose of the SimPL is entirely unique: to provide programmers 
with the choice of higher quality copyleft ―legal code‖ than the GPL 
provides. 
C. OSI Votes on the SimPL: Round 1 
By April, comments on the List about the SimPL had tapered off. 
In May, the License Approval Committee recommended approval of 
the SimPL, which moved the decision to the full OSI Board. The OSI 
Board, however, did not approve the SimPL on this first pass. 
Instead, it came back with a question for the author: Was SimPL-
licensed code compatible with GPL-licensed code? In other words, 
could code licensed under the SimPL then be re-licensed under the 
GPL? This question seemed out of place because the issue had been 
raised and revisions had been made to the SimPL to the satisfaction 
of the List.  
When the Board‘s decision about the SimPL was announced on 
the List, one commentator quickly pointed out that the Board‘s issue 
already had been resolved. It turned out, according to the chair of the 
License Approval Committee, that the Board members had been 
looking at an older (wrong) version of the SimPL. There had been a 
 
 44. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 33. 
 45. It also provides a form that may be more enforceable and legally up-to-date.  
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disconnect, and the purported issue was a non-issue. The chair of the 
License Approval Committee promised to take the SimPL back to the 
OSI Board.
46
 Despite repeated inquiries, however, neither the License 
Approval Committee nor the OSI Board reported any further action 
on SimPL until August. In all likelihood that was because, in the 
meantime, a ―perfect storm‖ in FOSS licensing was brewing.  
D. A FOSS Licensing Perfect Storm  
Several months after submission of the SimPL to OSI, the newly 
released GPLv3 was submitted to OSI for approval. In the same 
timeframe, Microsoft submitted two licenses for approval from its 
Shared Source initiative. In addition, three FOSS-related litigation 
matters were in play. One challenged the GPL as a violation of 
antitrust law.
47
 Another focused on the meaning of the Artistic 
License.
48
 And, most visibly, SCO had sued IBM over its distribution 
of Linux.
49
 All of these events coincided to create a FOSS licensing 
―perfect storm.‖ 
E. GPLv3 
GPLv3 represents the first update to the venerable GPL since 
1991.
50
 Its creation was a significant event in the hacker community. 
 
 46. According to an e-mail from Russ Nelson to the List:  
I did a once-over on the two and they seemed to match, however, I didn‘t read it 
carefully enough, because the latter says ―Licensing any Derived Work under the 
SimPL,‖ which caused us to reject the license. That‘s obviously not GPL compatible, 
however the license in the revised submission says ―Licensing it to everyone under 
SimPL, or substantially similar terms (such as GPL 2.0);‖ which clearly intends to be 
GPL compatible. I‘ll bring this back to the board. 
Posting of Russ Nelson, nelson@crynwr.com, to license-discuss@opensource.org (June 12, 
2007, 02:10 PDT), available at http://www.crynwr.com/cgi-bin/ezmlm-cgi?3:mss:12841: 
200706:ilpbhelnldefjkjmpjeh.  
 47. Wallace v. Int‘l Bus. Mach. Corp., 467 F.3d 1104, 1105 (7th Cir. 2006).  
 48. Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1380–82 (Fed. Cir. 2008). See generally 
Gomulkiewicz, supra note 14 (discussing the Jacobsen case and its lessons).  
 49. SCO Group, Inc. v. Int‘l Bus. Mach. Corp. No. 2:03CV294, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
62980 (D. Utah Sept. 1, 2006).  
 50. Stallman & Moglen, supra note 25. Richard Stallman is the primary author of the 
GPL: ―Stallman remains the GPL‘s author, with as much right to preserve its integrity as a 
work representative of his intentions as any other author . . . .‖ 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/9
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Many questions still exist about the ultimate impact of GPLv3. 
Stallman, in a document entitled Why Upgrade to GPL Version 3,
51
 
counsels that ―GPL version 2 will remain a valid license,‖ that 
―upgrading is a choice,‖ and that the reason to upgrade is ―because of 
the existing problems which GPLv3 will address.‖52 The primary 
―problems‖ that Stallman outlines involve issues such as 
―Tivoization,‖53 discouraging use of digital rights management 
code,
54
 and patent licensing/assertion issues.
55
  
So far, the primary authors of the Linux kernel have said that they 
do not intend to adopt GPLv3.
56
 FSF, of course, will use it for its 
software. How many other projects will adopt it remains to be seen.  
 
 51. Richard Stallman, Why Upgrade to GPL Version 3 (2007), http://gplv3.fsf.org/rms-
why.html. 
 52. Id. 
 53. GPLv2 requires those who make and distribute derivative works of GPL-licensed 
code to make source code available and grant the right to make further derivatives of it. The 
creators of the television record/replay product called TiVo use GPL-licensed Linux in their 
product. TiVo dutifully publishes and re-licenses its modifications of Linux under GPL 2.0. 
TiVo‘s hardware system, however, will shut down if it detects a version of Linux that is 
different from the version created by TiVo. In other words, a user has the means and the legal 
right to modify TiVo‘s version of Linux, but the user‘s modified version will not run on TiVo 
hardware. The FSF believes that this practice threatens software freedom: ―The manufacturers 
of these computers take advantage of the freedom that free software provides, but they don‘t let 
you do likewise.‖ Id. GPLv3 deals with this issue by conditioning ―the right to convey object 
code in a defined class of ‗User Products‘ . . . on providing whatever information is required to 
enable a recipient to replace the object code with a functioning modified version.‖ FREE 
SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, GPLV3 THIRD DISCUSSION DRAFT RATIONALE 9 (2007), available at 
http://www.gplv3.fsf.org/rationale.  
 54. Stallman, supra note 51. GPLv3 attempts to accomplish this objective by use of two 
mechanisms. First, the license provides that ―No covered work shall be deemed part of an 
effective technological measure under [the DMCA or similar laws stemming from the 1996 
WIPO copyright treaty].‖ GNU, General Public License version 3 § 3, ¶ 1 (June 29, 2007), 
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.html [hereinafter GPLv3]. This language seems directed at 
the language in the DMCA providing that circumvention is only prohibited for ―effective‖ 
technological measures. In other words, if the parties agree that a licensed work is not part of an 
effective technological measure, then the user may be free to circumvent it. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 1201(a)–(c) (2006). Second, the GPL uses the notions of waiver and disclaimer—in GPLv3, 
the licensor waives and disclaims his or her right to forbid circumvention under the DMCA (or 
similar law). GPLv3 § 3, ¶ 2. See also FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, GPLV3 SECOND 
DISCUSSION DRAFT RATIONALE 11 n.39 (2006), available at http://www.gplv3.fsf.org/gpl3-
dd1to2-markup-rationale.pdf; FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, supra note 53, at 44.  
 55. See Gomulkiewicz, A First Look, supra note 8, at 17–19 (describing the issues and 
GPLv3‘s approach to them).  
 56. See Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Forget About Linux Going GPLv3, LINUX-WATCH, 
June 13, 2007, http://www.linux-watch.com/news/NS3385486460.html. 
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Several weeks after FSF released the final version of GPLv3, the 
license was submitted to OSI for its approval.
57
 It is not clear whether 
this was done as an official act of the FSF. In many respects, FSF and 
OSI are rivals; Eric S. Raymond and others created OSI as a 
counterpoint to FSF—as a less ideological,58 more business-friendly 
voice for FOSS.
59
 There is no doubt this was a critique of FSF‘s 
approach, so it is doubtful that FSF believed it needed OSI‘s 
imprimatur on its new license. Nonetheless, OSI‘s approval of the 
license served some objectives for each organization.  
For OSI, the request to approve the license provided proof of the 
organization‘s stature in the FOSS community. In other words, if OSI 
did not ―matter,‖ then no one would have bothered to ask its approval 
of GPLv3. FSF benefited as well. By the time of the final release of 
GPLv3, it was clear that the FOSS community was not going to adopt 
the new license quickly on a significant scale.
60
 Given the skepticism 
surrounding GPLv3, FSF needed to surround it with as much 
legitimacy and support as possible.  
Several themes emerged as the List began to discuss GPLv3. First, 
many commentators said that GPLv3 did not need to abide by OSI‘s 
normal license approval process. This issue arose because the 
submitter of GPLv3 did not follow the standard operating procedure 
for submitting a license. In particular, he did not submit the required 
analysis of how the license conformed to the Open Source Definition 
or how the license was distinctive. Some on the List argued, 
essentially, that the OSI should take judicial notice of the GPLv3 
revision process and the GPL‘s stature in the hacker community. 
Others offered strong objections to this. Some complained that 
allowing special treatment diminished the credibility of OSI. If OSI 
wanted to be known as more that just a rag tag collection of 
 
 57. The license was submitted by Chris DiBona, a prominent hacker who works for 
Google. DiBona has edited two books about open source software: OPEN SOURCES: VOICES 
FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION (Chris DiBona et al. eds., 1999); and OPEN SOURCES 
2.0: THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION (Chris DiBona et al. eds., 2006). 
 58. For example, Stallman has said that developing software under the GPL is the only 
ethically satisfactory form of software development. Stallman & Moglen, supra note 25. 
 59. See Posting of Michael Tiemann to Open Source Initiative, History of the OSI, 
http://www.opensource.org/history (Sept. 19, 2006, 03:12 PDT). 
 60. See Stephen Shankland, Torvalds: No GPL 3 for Linux, CNET NEWS, Jan. 26, 2006, 
http://news.cnet.com/Torvalds-No-GPL-3-for-Linux/2100-7344_3-6031504.html.  
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programmers, they argued, then it needed to run its organization in a 
professional manner.  
Others argued that GPLv3 should not be approved because they 
disagreed with its substantive terms. The plaintiff in Wallace v. 
International Business Machines Corp.
61
 and one of his supporters 
were two of the main commentators in this vein. Discussion of the 
GPL‘s substantive terms covered a host of topics that have been 
circulating in the FOSS community for years, including the classic 
debates about whether the licensing model represented by the GPL or 
BSD License embodies the purest form of software freedom, whether 
the GPL is a ―pure license‖ or a contract,62 and whether the GPL‘s 
terms are a misuse of copyright.
63
 These debates raged over the 
course of hundreds of e-mail exchanges.  
Members of OSI on the List began to tire of the debate. They 
labeled several of the dissenters as ―trolls,‖ hoping to discourage 
them from further comment. When this did not work, OSI (after 
several unsuccessful attempts) blocked their access to the List. 
 
 61. 467 F.3d 1104 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 62. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 14, at 345–47; Rosen, supra note 7, at 51–71; Jason B. 
Wacha, Taking the Case: Is the GPL Enforceable?, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 451, 481–83 (2005). 
 63. See Christian H. Nadan, Open Source Licensing: Virus or Virtue?, 10 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 349, 367–70 (2002). 
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Less than a month after its submission, the OSI approved GPLv3.  
F. Microsoft’s Shared Source Licenses  
Microsoft submitted two of its Shared Source licenses for OSI 
approval. Microsoft created its Shared Source initiative in response to 
the success of the open source movement. Microsoft learned from the 
open source revolution that it had been too restrained in its licensing 
of source code. The Shared Source project seeks to license source 
code in areas where Microsoft thinks there is both programmer 
interest and strategic benefit to Microsoft.
64
  
Many commentators on the List were openly hostile to approval 
of these licenses, including OSI founder and past president, Eric S. 
Raymond.
65
 Raymond argued that because Microsoft and the FOSS 
community were in sharp disagreement over the way standards 
organizations should approach so-called open standards, Microsoft 
should not be rewarded with OSI‘s imprimatur. Other commentators 
were even less flattering, saying that Microsoft was the major enemy 
of FOSS, so OSI should not do anything to assist an enemy.  
Other List members demurred. They argued that OSI should be 
evenhanded, favoring neither FSF nor Microsoft. This approach, they 
argued, was in the best interest of OSI itself. If OSI did not prove to 
be evenhanded, it would lose credibility, which some thought was an 
open and alive issue in FOSS circles and beyond. In addition, to the 
extent OSI‘s license approval process is tied to its certification mark, 
discrimination is not permissible.
66
 
Other commentators on the List focused on the substance of the 
licenses. Microsoft responded to these comments either by pointing 
out how their licenses complied with the Open Source Definition or 
 
 64. For information on Microsoft‘s Shared Source Initiative, see Microsoft Shared Source 
Initiative Home Page, http://www.microsoft.com/resources/sharedsource/default.mspx (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2008). 
 65. See Posting of Esr to Open Source Initiative, My Resolve to Treat Microsoft Like Any 
Other License Submitter Is Being Sorely Tested, http://opensource.org/node/192 (Aug. 31, 
2007, 03:25 PDT).  
 66. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1063–1064 (2006) (providing that denial of use to a qualifying party 
can lead to cancellation of the mark). Perhaps it is this feature of certification marks that has led 
OSI to explore the possibility of using a service mark instead. See U.S. Trademark Registration 
No. 3514190 (filed Feb. 13, 2006) (registered Oct. 10, 2008) (OSI‘s service mark registration). 
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by revising them. The titles of the licenses also provoked extensive 
commentary. Many thought the titles caused confusion by misusing 
terms of art in the FOSS community. In response to these comments 
and using suggested new names offered on the List, Microsoft agreed 
to change the license names.  
The OSI Board took up the Microsoft licenses in October.
67
 After 
the meeting, the chair of the License Approval Committee, Russ 
Nelson, announced in his blog: 
In a board meeting held October 10th, and announced today, 
the Open Source Initiative approved two of Microsoft's 
software licenses: the Microsoft Reciprocal License and the 
Microsoft Public License. These licenses are refreshingly short 
and clean, compared to, say, the GPLv3 and the Sun CDDL. 
Like Larry Rosen‘s pair of licenses (the Academic Free 
License and Open Software License), they share a patent peace 
clause, a no-trademark-license clause, and they differ between 
each other only in the essential clause of reciprocation. 
 Of course, Microsoft is not widely trusted in the Open 
Source world, and their motives have been called into question 
during the approval discussions. How can they be attacking 
Open Source projects on one hand, and seeking not only to use 
open source methods, but use of the OSI Approved Open 
Source trademark? Nobody knows for sure except for 
Microsoft. But if you are confident that Open Source is the 
best way to develop software (as we at the Open Source 
Initiative are), then you can see why Microsoft would both 
attack Open Source and seek to use it at the same time. It is 
both their salvation and their enemy.
68
 
 
 67. See Posting of Michael Tiemann to Open Source Initiative, George Clooney, Princess 
Diana, and Microsoft, http://www.opensource.org/node/208 (Oct. 16, 2007, 08:49 PDT).  
 68. Posting of Nelson to Open Source Initiative, OSI Approves Microsoft Licenses, 
http://www.opensource.org/node/209 (Oct. 16, 2007, 17:23 PDT). 
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G. The Rest of the Story About the SimPL 
In September 2007, the chair of the License Approval Committee, 
Russ Nelson, reported on the August actions of the OSI Board: 
―Title: Simple Public License (SimPL): Status: The board wants to 
know what the plan is with respect to the GPLv3. In the interest of 
preserving as much compatibility between licenses, it would be nice 
if the SimPL allowed promotion to either the GPLv2 or GPLv3.‖69  
Promptly I responded in an e-mail to Russ Nelson: Yes, the 
SimPL allows re-licensing under either GPLv2 or GPLv3.
70
 Nelson 
promised to take the SimPL back to the OSI Board at the ―next 
available opportunity.‖71 
October passed with the news of OSI‘s approval of the Microsoft 
licenses. Finally, in November, OSI reported that the SimPL had 
been approved.
72
 Russ Nelson blogged:  
After a lengthy consideration, the Simple Public License 
(SimPL) has been added to the list of approved licenses. The 
concern was that because the SimPL is a reciprocal license, it 
could create its own ghetto of code unusable by any other 
project. However, because it contains language that allows 
relicensing under the GPL v2.0 or v3.0, this will not happen. 
That should give developers the confidence to adopt the 
SimPL without fear of marginalization.
73
 
 
 69. Email from Russ Nelson to Robert W. Gomulkiewicz (Sept. 6, 2007, 21:32) (on file 
with author). 
 70. I also told the List that I intended to create a SimPL 3.0 which would be a plain 
language rendering of GPLv3. E-mail from Robert W. Gomulkiewicz to Russ Nelson (Sept. 7, 
2007, 15:43 PDT) (on file with author). 
 71. E-mail from Russ Nelson to Robert W. Gomulkiewicz (Sept. 9, 2007, 13:04) (on file 
with author). 
 72. ―[A]ll are agreed that the SimPL doesn‘t merely comply with the Open Source 
Definition, it also does not contribute to license proliferation. Well done! I‘ve added it to the list 
of approved licenses . . . .‖ E-mail from Russ Nelson to Robert W. Gomulkiewicz (Nov. 7, 
2007, 16:57 PDT) (on file with author). 
 73. Posting of Nelson to Open Source Initiative, Simple Public License (SimPL) 
Approved, http://www.opensource.org/node/228 (Nov. 7, 2007, 22:06 PDT). 
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H. SimPL Lessons Learned 
There are a number of lessons that the SimPL license approval 
story teaches about FOSS licenses and license proliferation: (1) 
Influential, established players such as FSF strongly influence what 
can be done about license proliferation because their licenses are 
given status as the presumptive incumbent, and probably even 
irreplaceable, licenses; (2) OSI is tempted constantly to use its power 
to punish perceived enemies of the FOSS movement; (3) OSI is a 
resource-constrained volunteer organization74 that struggles to 
operate in an efficient, professional manner; and (4) OSI labors to 
simultaneously fulfill its goals of not approving duplicative FOSS 
licenses and of encouraging clearly written, simple, understandable 
FOSS licenses. These lessons and their implications will be discussed 
in the parts that follow.  
II. LICENSE PROLIFERATION: ITS CAUSES 
―License proliferation‖ can be defined as the creation of more and 
different FOSS licenses over time. How do we know this is 
occurring? Judging from discussions in hacker forums, the FOSS 
community certainly believes license proliferation is occurring;
75
 
strong proof is that OSI has approved over sixty licenses since its 
inception.
76
  
What provoked this outpouring of licenses? Some hackers 
attribute license proliferation to author vanity. Many call new FOSS 
licenses ―vanity licenses.‖ They claim that many license authors 
create new licenses to satisfy their pet peeves about wording and 
style. New licenses, they say, do not add anything of substance. At 
most, it is a matter of lawyers (or programmers acting as their own 
lawyers) quibbling over esoteric legal issues that have little or no 
 
 74. To get a flavor of this, see Posting of Zak to Open Source Initiative, Zak Greant‘s OSI 
Weekly Report 2008 Weeks 15–20, http://www.opensource.org/node/336 (May 25, 2008, 03:18 
PDT). 
 75. See Posting of Ken Coar to Open Source Initiative, The License Proliferation Project, 
http://www.opensource.org/proliferation (July 24, 2006, 21:54 PDT). 
 76. Posting of Michael Tiemann to Open Source Initiative, supra note 12. 
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significance. Perhaps some license proliferation can be explained in 
this manner, but there are deeper reasons.  
License quality (or the lack thereof) is an important driver. 
Programmers served as the primary authors of many of the early 
FOSS licenses, including the GPL and the Artistic License.
77
 Even 
those licenses written by institutional authors, such as the BSD 
License, do not appear to be works of skillful drafting.
78
 In short, 
these licenses represent poor to mediocre legal documents. On that 
basis alone one could credibly argue for new or at least new versions 
of many FOSS licenses.
79
  
Many fail to appreciate that FOSS licenses describe software 
development, distribution, and use licensing all in one document. 
These multifaceted FOSS licenses cover more ground than a typical 
mass-market software license, which focuses primarily on use rights. 
The GPL, for example, defines a programmer‘s right to modify 
Linux, what Linus Torvalds can do with such modifications, the 
Linux distribution rights of a PC manufacturer, and what an end user 
can do with Linux for either commercial or non-commercial 
purposes.
80
  
The bottom line is that FOSS licenses often describe relatively 
complex, nuanced licensing arrangements. To be comfortable using 
the license, a programmer should be comfortable with its goals and 
the methods of achieving those goals. Any variance means that the 
license is not the right fit. In other words, a new license usually meets 
a new need. This is not mere vanity; this is mere necessity. 
Ironically, the main culprits of license proliferation may be the 
loudest critics: those programmers who remain wed to outdated 
licenses. If programmers were willing to replace outdated, poorly 
drafted, or legally insufficient licenses with newer versions, the 
problem would be less severe. Many FOSS programmers, however, 
insist on the tried and true, which means the FOSS community can 
 
 77. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 6, at 1024–27 (describing Stallman‘s authorship of the 
GPL). 
 78. See Gomulkiewicz, De-Bugging Open Source Software Licensing, supra note 8, at 
80–96.  
 79. Id. at 99–103. 
 80. See GPLv3, supra note 54; Email from Robert W. Gomulkiewicz to Russ Nelson 
(Sept. 7, 2007, 15:43:20 PDT). 
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never shed older licenses. There is never a net reduction, only a net 
gain.
81
  
III. LICENSE PROLIFERATION: PROS AND CONS  
A. Pros 
I have already alluded to one major advantage of license 
proliferation, that new licenses often fix old problems. As mentioned, 
sometimes the problem might be that the old license does not comply 
with current law, or sometimes the old license has proven to be 
ambiguous, difficult to understand, or lacking an important term or 
condition. Whatever the bug, taking steps to fix the license makes 
sense even if it generates a ―new‖ license. 
New licenses also can be useful because they describe new or 
different ways of doing things. One of the most important 
characteristics of licenses is that they foster both technological and 
business model innovation in the information economy.
82
 Licenses 
contribute to technological innovation because they provide the 
mechanism for technology producers to collaborate and share ideas, 
works, and inventions in a variety of creative ways. Licenses 
contribute to business model innovation by providing the basis for 
technology producers to distribute their products to users through a 
wide range of useful mechanisms and channels.
83
 In other words, to 
the extent licenses support new ways of innovating, the production of 
new licenses represents helpful diversity.
84
 
 
 81. See Posting of Acoliver to Open Source Initiative, OSI Board Meeting Minutes, 
Wednesday, August 8, 2007, http://www.opensource.org/minutes20070808 (Mar. 1, 2008, 
21:00 PDT) (―Discussion about the inherent tension between approval of all licenses that match 
the OSD and desire to reduce overall number of licenses‖).  
 82. See XUAN-THAO N. NGUYEN, ROBERT W. GOMULKIEWICZ & DANIELLE CONWAY-
JONES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, SOFTWARE, AND INFORMATION LICENSING: LAW AND 
PRACTICE 2 (2006). 
 83. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit’s Licensing Law Jurisprudence: 
Its Nature and Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199 (2009) (describing how licensing supports 
innovation in the creation of products, customer solutions, distribution methods, and offers 
users a variety of products at various price points). 
 84. See generally Mann, supra note 2, at 39 (―Thus, the important question for open 
source communities is whether they can develop the institutional structures to modify the [open 
source] contracts successfully . . . .‖). 
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B. Cons 
The existence of multiple FOSS licenses creates difficulties, 
however, which is why the FOSS community usually condemns 
license proliferation. Programmers, distributors, and users of FOSS 
software all suffer negative effects.  
Programmers face two primary issues. First, a programmer faces 
the challenge of understanding the wide variety of licenses
85
 that 
accompany code that he or she would like to modify or include in his 
or her software (creating derivative works under copyright law).
86
 
Different licenses provide different rights to do so, often with 
particular nuances or conditions attached. A programmer has little 
margin for error in understanding the right to create and distribute 
derivative works, and a misstep may infringe a copyright with the 
unpleasant possibility of an injunction and damages.
87
 Using code 
licensed a particular way also affects the license that the programmer 
can use for his or her own code.
88
 
Second, a programmer faces the issue of what derivative works 
rights he or she wants to grant to other programmers.
89
 Does the 
programmer want to grant the right to create any type of derivative 
work? For any context? Does the programmer want to permit both 
commercial and non-commercial rights on similar terms? Does the 
programmer require attribution or provide warranties? Does he or she 
want to require others to ―share alike?‖ Does he or she want the 
copyright license to continue if patent rights are asserted? These and 
many other choices confront the programmer as he or she selects a 
license.
90
 The programmer, often with little or no legal counsel, 
 
 85. This issue of confusion over ―license fit‖ also exists for Creative Commons licenses 
used by artists and authors. See Katz, supra note 11, at 392–94. 
 86. See Posting of Ken Coar to Open Source Initiative, Report of License Proliferation 
Committee and Draft FAQ, ¶ 1, http://www.opensource.org/proliferation-report (July 31, 2006, 
16:01 PDT) (―[S]ome open source licenses do not inter-operate well with other open source 
licenses.‖). 
 87. Companies such as BlackDuck have developed software tools to try to address this 
difficulty. 
 88. See MEEKER, supra note 10, at 53–70. 
 89. See Posting of Ken Coar, supra note 86, ¶ 1 (―[T]oo many different licenses makes it 
difficult for licensors to choose.‖). 
 90. See Lawrence Rosen & Michael B. Einshlag, Which Open Source License Should I 
Use, http://www.rosenlaw.com/lj5.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2008) (Mr. Rosen is the former 
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confronts the hopelessly confusing question: Which of the sixty-plus 
OSI-approved licenses meet my particular objectives?  
Distributors face issues, too. They often put together packages of 
programs that will be useful to users. When the component programs 
come with a variety of licenses, the distributor faces the often-
complex task of determining whether the licenses permit the code to 
be combined in the package and which rights and obligations must be 
passed downstream. If the distributor does not take care in this 
process, it can be liable for copyright infringement. 
Finally, multiple licenses make life complicated for software end 
users.
91
 In one sense the license does not matter much. FOSS licenses 
permit users to run and use the software for end use without 
restriction. Many users of FOSS software, however, want to modify 
it, often to add new features, to add functionality, or to fix bugs. 
Indeed, access to source code and the right to change the code draws 
many sophisticated users to FOSS. Often this end user-revised 
software becomes part of the infrastructure that gives the end user a 
comparative advantage in the market. In creating these derivatives, 
the end user must face the issue of whether the FOSS licenses require 
the user to re-license derivatives in ways that may be detrimental to 
the user‘s strategic objectives.  
Confusion and potential liability are negative aspects of license 
proliferation. Another significant issue comes with the label ―license 
incompatibility.‖92 This means that one license encumbers what can 
be done with code licensed under another license.
93
 For example, 
GPLv2 says that if a programmer makes and distributes a derivative 
work of GPL-licensed code, then the programmer must license that 
derivative under the terms of GPLv2. The programmer cannot choose 
to license the derivative under the BSD License, Mozilla License, or 
even GPLv3.
94
 Only GPLv2 will do.  
 
General Counsel for OSI). 
 91. See Posting of Ken Coar, supra note 86, ¶ 1 (―[T]oo many licenses makes it difficult 
to understand what you are agreeing to in a multi-license distribution.‖). 
 92. See id. 
 93. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Entrepreneurial Open Source Hackers: MySQL and Its 
Dual Licensing, 9 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 203 (2004) (describing FOSS license 
compatibility issues faced by MySQL AB). 
 94. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Cultural Environmentalism and the Constructed 
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Incompatibility also arises when a programmer combines code 
licensed under licenses that require the programmer to re-license on 
mutually exclusive or contradictory terms. If one license says 
―attribution always required,‖ for instance, and the other license says 
―attribution can never be required,‖ then the programmer faces an 
impossible mission. GPLv2 creates this issue because it does not 
permit programmers to add additional conditions to the GPLv2-
licensed code. If the programmer wants to add an additional 
attribution requirement or a provision concerning patent 
indemnification, the GPLv2 does not permit this. If another license 
requires the attribution or patent indemnification, then the code 
cannot be combined because of the license incompatibilities. GPLv3 
addresses this, but only to a limited degree.
95
  
IV. LICENSE PROLIFERATION: JUST SAY ―NO‖ 
The FOSS community has proposed several solutions to the 
problems caused by license proliferation. The primary approach to 
date has been simple: discourage everyone from creating new 
licenses. The power of this approach should not be underestimated. 
Cultural norms carry significant weight in the FOSS community. 
Programmers do not ignore lightly the dictates of the FOSS leaders, 
particularly when there is consensus on a subject.  
FOSS community peer pressure uses three primary techniques: 
chastisement, denigration, and self-deprecation. First, hackers 
chastise those who create new FOSS licenses. This is done in general 
pronouncements by FOSS leaders that new licenses are unwelcome 
and then, when a new license is proposed, by directing disapproval at 
the license-creator. A typical epitaph is that someone merely has 
created a vanity license. Second, hackers denigrate the new license. 
They belittle its new features and harp on any perceived flaw. The 
 
Commons, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 47–48 (2007).  
 95. GPLv3, supra note 54, § 7. GPLv3 allows licensors to add additional permissions, but 
downstream re-licensors may remove these when they re-license. Id. Beyond that, GPLv3 
permits added warranty disclaimers, legal notices, prohibitions on misrepresentation of origin, 
limits on use of author‘s name for publicity, declining rights under trademark, and 
indemnification. Id.; see Gomulkiewicz, A First Look, supra note 8, at 19 (summarizing 
provisions of GPLv3).  
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basic theme is that the new license is no better (and probably worse) 
than some other FOSS license. Third, if the FOSS community made 
an impact on the license-creator through chastisement and 
denigration, then occasionally the license-creator will deprecate its 
own license, thus winning praise from the FOSS community. Self-
deprecation does not happen frequently. When it does, it often comes 
from license-creators who are attempting to establish their credentials 
in the FOSS community, such as Intel and Sun Microsystems.
96
 
Despite strong and repeated warnings about the ills of license 
proliferation, programmers continue to create new or revised 
licenses.
97
 The compelling reasons to do so seem to be 
overshadowing the admonitions of the FOSS elders. Cultural cowing 
alone does not seem to be potent enough to turn back the tide. 
V. OSI‘S LICENSE PROLIFERATION PROJECT 
OSI did what any self-respecting organization would do when 
confronted with a significant issue: it appointed a committee.
98
 The 
License Proliferation Committee (―LP Committee‖) drew on many 
prominent figures in the FOSS community, including Eric S. 
Raymond as well as several lawyers. The LP Committee received 
input via a special e-mail discussion list.
99
 The OSI Board accepted
100
 
the LP Committee‘s report (―LP Report‖) in 2006.  
Under the heading ―What the OSI Can Do About License 
Proliferation,‖ the LP Report states that the first thing that OSI must 
do to solve the ills of license proliferation ―is to make sure that 
licenses calling themselves ‗open source‘ truly meet the Open Source 
 
 96. Posting of Ken Coar, supra note 86, ¶ 4 (noting that Intel voluntarily retired the Intel 
Open Source License and Sun the Sun Industry Standards Source License). 
 97. A well reasoned, practical admonition was published by Larry Rosen in 2005. See 
Lawrence Rosen, License Proliferation (2005), http://www.rosenlaw.com/LicenseProliferation. 
pdf. 
 98. See Posting of Ken Coar, supra note 86. The LP Committee began its work in 2004. 
Id. 
 99. The archive of that discussion can be found on the OSI website. Open Source 
Initiative, Mailing Lists, http://www.opensource.org/lists (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
 100. Comment of DrErnie to Posting of Ken Coar to Open Source Initiative, The License 
Proliferation Project, http://opensource.org/proliferation-report (Dec. 12, 2007, 17:37 PDT) 
(―The OSI Board accepted the Report of the License Proliferation Committee in 2006, so this is 
now ‗final.‘‖). 
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Definition.‖101 The LP Report points out that the LP Committee 
suggested three guidelines to determine whether licenses should be 
OSI-approved: ―[(1)] the license must not be duplicative[; (2)] the 
license must be clearly written, simple, and understandable[; and (3)] 
the license must be reusable.‖102 As discussed below, these guidelines 
may neither stem license proliferation
103
 nor add any clarity to 
whether licenses ―truly meet the Open Source Definition.‖104 The 
non-duplicative requirement may also be inconsistent with use of an 
OSI-Certified certification mark, which, by law,
105
 must be available 
to all who meet the standard, in this case, the Open Source 
Definition. 
The LP Report made two major recommendations. First, it 
recommended that OSI create a web-based license selection 
―wizard.‖ This software tool would assist new licensors in finding 
and choosing licenses that meet their goals. ―We hope that being able 
to generate a list of existing licenses that meet defined goals will 
lessen the need for people to create their own new licenses.‖106  
Second, the LP Report suggested that OSI divide OSI-approved 
licenses into various categories. The LP Committee began with bold 
plans to label certain licenses as ―recommended‖ and others as ―non-
recommended.‖ The Committee, however, backed away from that 
approach because any such normative characterization would be a 
―policy matter for the OSI Board to decide.‖107 The LP Committee 
apparently did not believe that it even had the authority to make 
recommendations to the OSI Board along these lines. Or perhaps it 
 
 101. Posting of Ken Coar, supra note 86, ¶ 2. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See infra Part VI. There may be an inherent inconsistency between a goal of creating 
clear, simple, and understandable licenses and a goal of creating fewer licenses when nothing is 
done to pare back poorly written legacy licenses. 
 104. See infra Part VI. OSI is already committed to making sure approved licenses meet 
the Definition. That never seems to have been in doubt, so it is unclear how the LP Report adds 
anything to that mandate. Indeed, OSI cannot legally license its OSI-compliant mark unless it 
accurately certifies compliance with the Definition.  
 105. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5) (2006). 
 106. Posting of Ken Coar, supra note 86, ¶ 3. According to the LP Report, law students 
from USC and engineering students from San Francisco State have begun work on this project. 
Id. 
 107. Id. ¶ 4. 
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discovered that this task would be too perilous from a political 
standpoint and so was not worth attempting. 
Instead, the LP Committee divided licenses into ―descriptive 
categories.‖ The categories are: (1) ―popular and widely used or with 
strong communities‖; (2) special purpose licenses (e.g., academic, 
government); (3) ―redundant with more popular licenses‖; (4) ―non-
reusable‖ licenses; (5) ―other/miscellaneous‖; (6) superseded; and (7) 
voluntarily retired. The LP Reports lists nine licenses as ―popular‖ 
and nine licenses as ―redundant.‖108  
The LP Committee stated that the main purpose of these 
categories was to encourage use of the most popular licenses.
109
 It 
acknowledged that license popularity ―at first sight might not seem 
appropriate‖ as a measuring stick but justified its approach by saying:  
[P]opular and long-established licenses have an important 
thing going for them: the existence of an established 
interpretive tradition and a well-developed set of expectations 
about correct behavior with respect to them. This is significant 
in reducing confusion and (especially in common-law 
countries) is even likely to condition judicial interpretation of 
the licenses.‖110 
VI. LP REPORT: A STEP SIDEWAYS (AND MAYBE BACKWARD) 
At best, the LP Report represents a step sideways. The Report‘s 
first recommendation, to make sure that licenses calling themselves 
―open source‖ meet the Open Source Definition, breaks no new 
ground. One of OSI‘s primary missions is to do just that. OSI, in fact, 
spends a great deal of time and energy on that core mission (as 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Posting of Ken Coar, supra note 86, ¶ 4. This conclusion may or may not be accurate. 
The touchstone of contract interpretation is the intent of the parties, not the intent of a drafter of 
a standard form (e.g., the FSF in the case of the GPL) or ―interpretive tradition.‖ To the extent 
that the particular parties to a FOSS license have knowledge of and/or intend to adopt the FOSS 
community‘s interpretative tradition, this tradition may come into the contract by reference, or 
the tradition may be applied if a court needs to rely on industry custom to construe an 
ambiguous license. See NGUYEN, GOMULKIEWICZ & CONWAY-JONES, supra note 82, at 528–
29; Gomulkiewicz, supra note 14, at 337–38. 
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illustrated by the SimPL case study). Nothing in the LP Report 
improves OSI‘s approach to that assignment.111  
The Report‘s second recommendation, to create a license selection 
wizard, seems to be a useful idea. Creative Commons, for example, 
employs this type of technology to help users pick best-fit license 
terms for their works of authorship. As described in the LP Report, 
however, the wizard seems to have only minor utility. The wizard 
will generate a list of licenses that ―meet (or almost meet)‖112 the 
hacker‘s criteria. After the wizard generates the list, the hacker faces 
the hardest task—deciding which of the choices is most appropriate. 
The wizard provides no advice on this choice other than, perhaps, to 
inform the hacker that certain choices are ―popular‖ and others are 
―redundant.‖  
The Report‘s third recommendation, to create various descriptive 
license categories, seems to add little to the current state of play. 
Most hackers already know which licenses are the most popular. It 
comes as no surprise that the first six licenses listed as ―popular‖ are 
the Apache License 2.0, the BSD License (new version), GPLv2, 
LGPLv2, MIT License, and the Mozilla Public License.
113
 Most 
hackers already select licenses based primarily on the notoriety of the 
license (which is why the GPL is the most-used
114
 license on hacker 
websites such as SourceForge and Freshmeat).
115
 Interestingly, as of 
October 2008, both the SimPL and GPLv3 were placed in a category 
called ―Uncategorized Licenses.‖116 
Arguably, the LP Report‘s approach is even worse than a step 
sideways. In some respects it is a step backward. In attempting to 
direct hackers to ―popular‖ licenses, OSI may not be directing 
 
 111. Lately, OSI has reorganized its discussion lists in an attempt to streamline the license 
approval process and to create a general forum to discuss FOSS licensing-related issues. 
 112. Posting of Ken Coar, supra note 86, ¶ 3. 
 113. Id. ¶ 4; see also ROSEN, supra note 7, at 73–225 (discussing all of these licenses); 
Gomulkiewicz, De-Bugging Open Source Software Licensing, supra note 8, at 83 (mentioning 
most of these licenses and pointing out that the GPL and BSD License are most popular). 
 114. See Freshmeat, Statistics and Top 20, http://freshmeat.net/stats/rating (last visited Oct. 
28, 2008); SourceForge, Software Map, http://sourceforge.net/softwaremap/ (last visited Nov. 
6, 2008).  
 115. See Gomulkiewicz, De-Bugging Open Source Software Licensing, supra note 8, at 
82–83, 83 n.57; McGowan, supra note 30, at 2–3, 14–15; Vetter, Exit and Voice, supra note 11. 
 116. Posting of Nelson to Open Source Initiative, Open Source Licenses by Category, 
http://www.opensource.org/licenses/category (Sept. 19, 2006, 08:43 PDT).  
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/9
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  Open Source License Proliferation 287 
 
 
hackers to the best licenses.
117
 It acknowledged that several 
―redundant‖ licenses were ―excellent‖ and ―had their own following.‖ 
Several of the popular licenses have many known bugs.
118
  
OSI justified its actions out of a perceived need to ―prune 
licenses.‖ OSI did not actually prune any licenses, however. It tried to 
do so indirectly by putting the licenses in a category with a pejorative 
name: ―redundant.‖ In other words, it attempted pruning by 
deprecation—the branch was never cut off but only bruised and 
marred to make it look unattractive.
119
  
Furthermore, directing hackers to popular but buggy licenses runs 
counter to OSI‘s stated objective of promoting licenses that are 
―clearly written, simple, and understandable.‖120 If OSI does nothing 
more than encourage hackers to use the same old licenses, it is nearly 
impossible to help them use better legal code.
121
 This seems ironic. 
One of OSI‘s signature claims is that the process for creating open 
source software assures that it will be of higher quality than so-called 
proprietary software. By contrast, OSI‘s process for picking licenses 
seems to ensure that legacy legal code will survive, no matter how 
buggy or outmoded.
122
 This creates a contradiction between OSI‘s 
 
 117. See E-mail from Chris Travers, chris.travers@gmail.com, to License Discuss, license-
discuss@opensource.org (Oct. 11, 2007 08:58) (pointing out that OSI license categories are 
―largely useless‖ and tilt the playing field against using well drafted licenses such as the AFL 
3.0 drafted by Larry Rosen).  
 118. Eric Steven Raymond & Catherine Olanich Raymond, Licensing HOWTO (Nov. 9, 
2002), http://www.catb.org/~esr/Licensing-HOWTO.html (describing the Apache, BSD, and 
MIT licenses as ―Obsolete. Still popular‖ and the LGPL as ―Not recommended‖). 
 119. Picking up on this ―redundant‖ label, one hacker criticized former OSI General 
Counsel Larry Rosen‘s suggestion to use his AFL 3.0: ―Why would he want to switch to an 
unpopular license that the OSI lists as redundant? I realize you wrote it, but it hasn‘t done 
anything to help with license proliferation. You wrote the license you thought people should 
use, rather than the license people wanted to use.‖ E-mail from Donovan Hawkins, 
Hawkins@cephira.com, to License Discuss, license-discuss@opensource.org (Oct. 16, 2007 
14:00).  
 120. Posting of Ken Coar to Open Source Initiative, supra note 86. 
 121. Raymond & Raymond, supra note 118 (―In the past, we‘ve had a strong tendency to 
organize our sub-communities around licenses; Perl people think of the Artistic License as part 
of their subcultural identity, BSDers are attached to the BSD license, and Free Software 
Foundation partisans can‘t imagine life without the GPL. The problem is that in the new high-
threat legal environment we now face, all these licenses are broken, or at least less than the best 
license technology available.‖). 
 122. Id. (―[W]e need to stop treating project licenses as immutable sacred texts, ideological 
banners, or territory, and start thinking of them as functional software—which, like all 
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goals of a license not being ―duplicative‖ and a license being clear-
simple-understandable unless OSI allows legacy licenses to be 
replaced by newer ones that do the same thing, only better.  
VII. OSI AND LICENSE PROLIFERATION: THREE BOLDER STEPS 
FORWARD 
The LP Report attempted to put a crimp in the troublesome 
aspects of license proliferation, but its recommendations do not seem 
bold enough to have a significant impact. If anything, they could 
represent a step backward because the LP Report makes such a strong 
push to promote the use of ―popular‖ licenses, no matter how 
outmoded. This part proposes three bolder steps that could make a 
greater impact. 
A. A Wizzier Wizzard 
The LP Report proposes a license selection wizard that does little 
more than narrow down the list of potential licenses to the same set 
of licenses that a hacker likely would consider anyway. A license 
selection wizard could be engineered to do much more than that. The 
Creative Commons wizard, for example, walks authors through a 
series of queries that tease out the author‘s objectives and then 
generates a license to match.
123
 The OSI license wizard could provide 
a programmer with a series of queries to help the programmer think 
through the laundry list of choices that go into selecting a FOSS 
license. The wizard could provide links to explanatory information 
that might be useful for the programmer to better understand complex 
issues (such as what the GPL means by ―work based on a program‖). 
The wizard could even offer the programmer the choice of ―popular‖ 
and ―redundant‖ licenses and explain the pros and cons of choosing 
one over the other.  
 
software, needs periodic upgrading.‖); see Gomulkiewicz, supra note 6, at 1016, 1027 
(describing how the FSF views the GPL as free software‘s ―constitution‖). 
 123. Creative Commons: Choose a License, http://creativecommons.org/license/ (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2008). 
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B. Best Practices and Legacy Licenses 
The boldest step would be for OSI to select and promote a 
collection of licenses that it thinks represent FOSS licensing best 
practices. OSI backed away from this once before but it should 
consider the following proposal: Periodically, OSI could send out a 
Request For Proposals (―RFP‖). The RFP would specify the types of 
license forms that OSI considers useful, such as copyleft and 
permissive, and features that it would like the licenses to have, such 
as warranty disclaimers or the ability to be used internationally. 
These license types and useful features would evolve over time as 
technology, business practices, and the licensing law progress. Every 
new best practice license would contain a backward compatibility 
feature to assure that software licensed under superseded licenses 
could still be used in projects using new best practices licenses. 
From the licenses submitted in response to the RFP, OSI would 
designate certain licenses as its ―best practices‖ licenses within 
various categories (e.g., best practice license in the GPLv2 tradition, 
in the BSD License tradition, or in the Mozilla License tradition).
124
 
OSI would promote those licenses as the preferred licenses for 
hackers to use. A special best practices logo could be created for use 
with software employing these licenses.
125
  
This proposal, of course, might lead to tension between FSF and 
OSI if OSI does not choose the GPL as a ―best practice‖ license. 
Perhaps this tension could be eased by creation of another category of 
license: Legacy Licenses. OSI would define this category as licenses 
to be chosen by programmers who are selecting a license primarily 
because of alliance to a certain group, such as FSF, Perl, or a BSD 
distribution. This is a legitimate choice; many programmers trust the 
leaders of these groups in all matters relating to FOSS, including 
licensing. OSI, however, would be providing a clearer choice for 
 
 124. The ―best practices‖ nomenclature is commonly used in the business world. See David 
Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 308 (2006). The label has been suggested for 
use with open source licenses. See Raymond & Raymond, supra note 118 (labeling certain 
licenses as ―best practice‖ and urging hackers to pick a ―best practice‖ license). 
 125. OSI‘s Bylaw revision of March 2005 opens up this possibility. See Open Source 
Initiative, OSI Board Meeting Minutes, March 7, 2005, http://opensource.org/minutes20050307 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2009). 
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those hackers who do not care to choose a license primarily for 
symbolic or group membership purposes. If the number of licenses 
could be pared down to Best Practices and Legacy Licenses, then OSI 
would have made significant progress in rolling back the negative 
aspects of license proliferation. 
C. More Legal Services for Hackers  
Even with a wizzier wizard than the LP Report proposes and the 
promotion of ―Best Practice‖ licenses, OSI could provide more 
services to help hackers intelligently select a license. OSI could take 
steps to increase hackers‘ access to legal services126 that would help 
them choose. First, OSI could commission an analysis of OSI-
approved licenses. This analysis could be turned into a document that 
provides a hacker-friendly description of the attributes of each OSI-
approved license.  
Second, OSI could work with law school clinics to provide pre-
legal advice—advice that will empower the hacker to have a 
constructive, focused session with legal counsel.
127
 The main 
objective of such a clinic would be to get the hacker to focus on the 
relevant questions, identify the universe of relevant licenses, and 
begin to think through the trade-offs.
128
 The hacker would make a 
final decision after consulting with a legal expert or decide no legal 
advice is necessary.
129
 
 
 126. OSI may be considering a program to enlist pro bono assistance. See Posting of 
Acoliver to Open Source Initiative, OSI Board Meeting Minutes, Monday, March 3, 2008, 
http://opensource.org/minutes20080303 (Mar. 20, 2008, 18:45 PDT).  
 127. See Sean M. O‘Connor, Teaching IP from an Entrepreneurial Counseling and 
Transactional Perspective, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 877 (2008). 
 128. FSF recently has significantly ramped up its legal services. Columbia Law School 
hosts the Software Freedom Law Center (―SFLC‖) which provides advice related to the GPL as 
well as enforcement. The Center has a full-time paid staff. SFLC also has a ―for profit‖ affiliate 
law firm, Moglen Ravicher, that is fully owned by the SFLC. See Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, 
SFLC Announces a For-Profit, Open Source Law Firm, LINUX-WATCH, Mar. 27, 2008, 
http://www.linux-watch.com/NS5468493767.html.  
 129. See Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Finding the Right Open Source Savvy Lawyer, 
LINUX-WATCH, Apr. 6, 2008, http://www.linux-watch.com/news/NS9923280341.html.  
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CONCLUSION  
FOSS license proliferation represents both helpful diversity and 
hopeless confusion. The FOSS hacker community has identified the 
negative aspects of license proliferation, but its approach to address 
proliferation has been largely ineffective. This Article proposes three 
bolder steps that could make a meaningful impact and, as a 
consequence, improve the climate for the success of FOSS. 
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